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Abstract: Motivations behind a country’s importation of waste are categorized into the pollution
haven hypothesis (PHH) and the resource hunting hypothesis (RHH). The importation of wastes
can lead to environmental sustainability concerns, requiring governments to intervene when the
market fails to reduce the negative externalities by strengthening and implementing environmental
regulations. Motivated by China’s position within a rapidly growing but environmentally damaging
sector of trade, this paper has three goals: (1) to classify the primary hypothesis that governs China’s
flow of traded wastes; (2) to verify the heterogeneous impact of the pollution paradise motivation and
resource demand motivation of waste imports from developed and developing countries, and across
industries; (3) to assess the impact of domestic environmental regulations on the motives behind
China’s waste imports. Using 28 imported waste-varieties from 20 of China’s major trade partners
across 24 years, findings indicate that the flow of Chinese waste imports is relatively unresponsive
under the pollution haven effect. However, the resource hunting effect from developing countries is
significantly greater than what originates from developed countries, despite the laws of 2011 and
2017 established to restrict resource hunting activities. These results have important implications for
improving the efficiency of China’s waste sorting and recycling systems.
Keywords: waste imports; pollution haven; resource demand; environmental regulation; develop-
ing country
1. Introduction
Among researchers and policymakers, expanding global trade and investment has
become the fuel that drives concerns of environmental sustainability caused by the flow of
production factors across borders. According to Kellenberg [1], wastes trade in 2012 was
approximately 500% greater in size compared with two decades earlier and is becoming
a crucial component of global factor flows [2]. Dominated by concerns of environmental
pollution [3] and illegal dumping [4] through traded wastes, the literature remains concen-
trated on developed countries such as the United States and those in the European Union,
while waste trade in developing countries has received limited attention [5]. This is despite
developing countries being the lead importers of wastes due to relaxed environmental
regulations, low labor costs, and strong demand for resources [2,6].
According to Kellenberg [7], waste has a dual characteristic. Waste is pollution that
needs to be disposed of by developed countries with strict environmental regulations,
while perhaps being misplaced resources for developing countries’ recycling industry. As a
result, we can categorize the drive for trading wastes under two hypotheses. First, there is
the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH), which has been widely used to study environmental
issues in international trade and investment literature. PHH holds that each country’s
Sustainability 2021, 13, 932. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13020932 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2021, 13, 932 2 of 21
environment can be regarded as a factor of production, and the differences in environmental
regulations will change the flow of international factors of production [8]. Therefore, PHH
advocates that developed countries with strict environmental regulations will export large
quantities of wastes that cannot be disposed of domestically and developing countries will
become their waste refuge.
Second, as a misplaced resource, developing countries have the motivation to find
wastes as an intermediate input for manufacturing development [7], defined as the resource
hunting hypothesis (RHH). The assumption is that developing countries import large
quantities of wastes in efforts to find the cheapest intermediate inputs, which are used
as recycled raw materials within the manufacturing process [1]. It should be noted that
despite the well-established economic rationale and theoretical explanations of PHH and
RHH, no consistent evidence has been identified to support this empirical analysis.
Since 1995, China has become a dominant player in the global wastes market [9–11],
capturing 45% of the world’s wastes volume imported and 72% of all imported waste
plastics. According to PHH and RHH, wastes imported by China may be directly incin-
erated and landfilled [12], or they may be recycled as raw materials for manufacturing
development. Regardless of the motives, Chinese waste imports, i.e., foreign garbage
in China, can cause negative externalities to the ecological environment, the health of
citizens, and the domestic recycling systems. Affected by the upgrading of industrial
structure and the destocking of industrial output before 2010, China began to strengthen
its environmental regulation over imported waste. Two significant laws regarding the
environment promulgated in 2011 and 2017 and struck China’s flow of waste imports.
However, insufficient evidence exists regarding these laws and their impacts on China’s
waste imports motives across different categories of wastes. Further research on these
issues is expected to heighten China’s and other developing countries’ awareness of the
management of traded wastes.
Motivated by China’s dominating import position and environmental concerns, this
research contributes to the trade and environmental literature of developing countries by
empirically analyzing a neglected but highly pollutive component of international trade.
First, this article provides evidence of imports by China to assess whether waste trade in
developing countries fits PHH or RHH. Second, this research verifies the heterogeneous
impact of the pollution paradise and resource demand motivations in Chinese waste im-
ports between developed and developing countries, as well as between the metals, woods,
plastics, and textiles industries. Third, given China’s increasingly stringent environmen-
tal regulatory policies in recent years, the research also analyzes whether environmental
regulations have impacted the pollution paradise and resource demand motives behind
Chinese imported wastes.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows: Section 2 continues with a brief review
of the relevant literature, summarizing theoretical frameworks and empirical studies.
Section 3 provides an overview that briefly describes the state of China’s waste imports.
The following section introduces the choice of model and data, followed by some empirical
results and a discussion of these findings. Finally, concluding remarks coupled with
implications for further consideration are stated.
2. Literature Review
Given the significant growth in the volume of wastes trade, scholarly attention has
been directed to the negative externality to people’s health and the environmental sustain-
ability of developing countries [13]. To measure waste trade, Kellenberg [7] reviewed the
determinants of waste trade by focusing on wastes and scrap categories within the six-digit
level of the harmonized system (HS). The author found that the top 10 waste-exporting
countries are developed countries, while China stands as the biggest importer globally.
Subsequently, researchers were able to use quantitative methods to study the scale, flow,
structure, and motivations of global waste trade [1]. Studies have also focused on waste
exports from developed countries such as the European Union [14] and Japan [15] and the
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waste import position of developing countries like China [16] and India [17]. The position
and impact of various waste categories on the environment are also studied; examples are
scrapped woods [16], scrapped metals [10], scrapped plastics [18], and electronic waste
(e-waste) [19].
On the one hand, traditional studies believe that waste trade is a form of international
pollution transfer and attribute this phenomenon to wastes traded from developed coun-
tries to developing countries [7] under PHH. PHH was first proposed by Pethig [20] and
used to explain how the flow of international production factors is affected by differences
in environmental regulations among countries [8]. PHH believes that strict environmental
regulation is a cost to the host country, which reduces the company’s international compet-
itiveness and negatively affects FDI destination choice and trade comparative advantage.
This theory has become the theoretical foundation for countries with higher environmental
regulations to impose tariffs on countries with lower regulations. PHH is widely referenced
in empirical studies on environmental regulations, international trade flows, and FDI
location selection [21–23].
The rapid expansion of the global waste trade has become the backdrop for studies
shifting focus on wastes trade that complies with PHH. Baggs [13] used GDP per capita as
a proxy variable for environmental regulation. Based on self-reported waste trade data, this
study found that an increase in GDP per capita significantly reduced the country’s waste im-
ports, suggesting that motives for wastes trade are captured by PHH. Kellenberg [7], using
a cross-country panel dataset, found that countries with slack environmental regulations
tend to import more wastes. Differences in environmental regulations among countries
have played an important role in the flow of wastes trade. Okubo et al. [15] revealed that
Japan mainly exports waste to Asian countries with low GDP per capita, broad market, and
less restrictive environmental regulations. However, Higashida and Managi [24], who used
wage per capita and GDP per capita as proxy variables for environmental regulation, found
no evidence to support PHH. The empirical assessment of Nuñez-Rocha [14] on waste
trade among European Union member states found no evidence of pollution resulting from
waste imports in the less developed European Union countries.
On the other hand, an analysis of the entire life cycle of waste finds that waste produc-
tions may be incinerated, landfilled, directly discarded, or recycled into raw materials for
manufacturing in the importing country [7]. Importers are highly motivated to find low-
cost wastes for developing countries challenged by scarce resources and strong demand
for raw materials used within manufacturing. Despite the attention paid to the possibil-
ity of resource demand motivations behind waste imports [25], there was not sufficient
evidence to support this hypothesis. It was not until the seminal work of Higashida and
Managi [24] that proof of RHH could be established. The authors found that countries with
higher wages per capita and GDP per capita imported more recyclable wastes, whereas
developing countries imported wastes from the more developed countries with expanded
industries and strong economic growth. Sawhney et al. [17] found that India’s abundant
labor force and domestic demand for metal are the key factors driving the country’s wastes
metals import. In general, neither the waste trade is motivated by PHH nor has RHH been
unanimously supported by empirical evidence.
According to the pollution externalities theory, in an open economy, trading wastes
creates negative effects on society that can be resolved through environmental regula-
tions [26,27]; the Basel Agreement is one example. Various literature evaluated the effec-
tiveness of multilateral environmental agreements and found that the Basel Convention
does not significantly impact the flow of wastes trades [28–30]. As a result, later stud-
ies focused on unilateral regulations. More specifically, studies that account for China’s
increasing policies found that the waste import controls after 2010 have significantly re-
duced the country’s scrapped metals imports [10], waste wood imports [16], and plastics
waste imports [18]).
PHH and RHH identify waste trade with dual characteristics, i.e., pollution and
resources. Under PHH, countries with strong restrictive environmental regulations tend
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to dump wastes into countries with lax environmental regulations, which receive and
disposes of (incinerate or landfill) wastes for profit. RHH assumes countries with strong
demand for raw materials will look for cheap raw materials around the world by importing
wastes for reuse within manufacturing. Whether motivated by pollution discharge or
resource demand, the importation of significant volumes of wastes would result in negative
externalities to the environment and the health of citizens. According to the pollution
externalities theory, governments should intervene when the market fails to reduce negative
externalities by strengthening and implementing environmental regulations and policies.
This paper utilizes a panel dataset of 28 imported waste varieties from 20 countries
into China during the years 1995 to 2018. By using the fixed effects (FE) and least-squares
dummy variables (LSDV) approaches, we assess whether China’s pattern of imported waste
effect is based on PHH or RHH motives while analyzing the heterogeneous effects between
countries and among waste categories. The discussion will target China’s environmental
regulations and their restrictiveness on waste imports in recent years.
3. Overview of China’s Waste Import
3.1. China’s Waste Import
China’s waste imports can be traced back to its reform and “opening-up.” After the
country joined the WTO at the end of 2001, the value of the waste imports increased
remarkably; peaking around $27.1 billion USD in 2011. However, following the enactment
of the 2011 law “Measures on the Administration of Import of Solid Waste,” the value of
imports for the six consecutive years to follow quickly declined but later rebounded. In
2017, the “Implemented Plan on Banning Entry of Foreign Garbage and Reforming the
Administrative System of Solid Waste Importation” caused the import value to drop to
$13.4 billion USD a year later (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The total value of waste imports for 1995–2018. (Source: CEPII-BACI database).
Figure 2 indicates the quantity of China’s waste imports between 1995 and 2018. Fol-
lowing a similar flow to the value of waste imports, the total quantity displayed downward
trends after the restrictive environmental laws took effect in 2011 and 2017.
According to Kellenberg [7], 62 varieties of products at the HS6 level could be treated
as traded wastes. For China, 28 of them are the highest value of imports in various waste
products with a share of 99.4% in 2018. Using a similar methodology of separation to
Sun [16] and Okubo et al. [15], we split the import of the wastes for these 28 varieties into
four categories of wastes—metal, paper, plastic, and textile. The categories of waste are
presented in Table 1.
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Figure 2. The total quantity of waste imports for 1995–2018. (Source: CEPII-BACI database).
Table 1. Categories of China’s waste import.
Categories HS6 Code HS6 Description
waste metal
720410 Waste and scrap of cast iron
720421 Waste and scrap of stainless steel
720429 Waste and scrap of alloy steel other than stainless steel
720430 Waste and scrap of tinned iron/steel
720441 Ferrous turnings, shavings, chips, milling waste, sawdust, filings
720449 Ferrous waste and scrap (excl. of 7204.10–7204.41)
740400 Copper waste and scrap
750300 Nickel waste and scrap
760200 Aluminum waste and scrap
780200 Lead waste and scrap
790200 Zinc waste and scrap
800200 Tin waste and scrap
810420 Magnesium waste and scrap
810600 Bismuth and arts. thereof, incl. waste and scrap
waste paper
470710 Recovered (waste and scrap) unbleached kraft paper/paperboard
470720 Recovered (waste and scrap) paper/paperboard mainly of bleached chem.
470730 Recovered (waste and scrap) paper/paperboard made mainly of mech. Pulp
470790 Recovered (waste and scrap) paper/paperboard (excl. of 4707.10–4707.30)
waste plastic
391510 Waste, parings and scrap, of polymers of ethylene
391520 Waste, parings and scrap, of polymers of styrene
391530 Waste, parings and scrap, of polymers of vinyl chloride
391590 Waste, parings and scrap, of plastics n.e.s. in 39.15
waste textile
500390 Silk waste (incl. cocoons unsuit. for reeling, yarn waste, and garnetted stock)
510320 Waste of wool/of fine animal hair, incl. yarn waste
520210 Yarn waste (incl. thread waste), of cotton
520299 Cotton waste other than yarn waste
550510 Waste (incl. noils, yarn waste, and garnetted stock) of synth. fibers
550520 Waste (incl. noils, yarn waste, and garnetted stock) of art. Fibers
Source: Kellenberg [7], Sun [16], and Okubo et al. [15].
In 2018, metal was the highest value of wastes imported, taking around 78.4% of total
waste imports. Paper accounted for a share of 20.2% of the value of total waste imports; in
the same year, 0.5% of wastes imports were plastic and 0.3% were from the textile category.
A combined value of the remaining 34 varieties of waste products accounted for 0.6%.
Figure 3 indicates China’s import values and quantities for these four categories, in
which patterns of metal waste and paper waste show similarity to the total waste imports,
which were impacted by the laws imposed in 2011 and 2017. For plastic waste and textile
waste, the import values increased after 2011 but declined dramatically following the
law banning entry of foreign garbage. Import values are just $67.8 million USD and
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$41.8 million USD in 2018, 3.9% and 18.9%, respectively, when compared with their highest
import values in 2013 and 2014.
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In 2018, the top five countries and regions exporting wastes to China were the United
States, Japan, Hong Kong, United Kingdom, and Germany. China imported 62.6% of all
waste products from these five countries. All major orientations of wastes imported by
China are from developed economies. Figure 4 indicates China’s import value of waste
products from these top five countries. Indications are that all major locations were also
impacted by the more restricted environmental regulations enacted in 2011 and 2017.
Notably, there are clear declining trends after the promulgation of these laws.
Figure 4. Value of waste imports from major countries for 1995–2018. (Source: China’s Customs
Statistics).
3.2. China’s Laws on Waste Imports
Attributed to a lack of restrictive regulations and inefficiencies in the implementation
of laws, China’s waste imports increased with relatively high acceleration before 2007.
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Yoshida et al. [9], Velis [11] and [12] found that China was the major waste importer due
to relatively less restrict regulations, especially in the high growth of waste imports from
developed countries (according to Kellenberg [7], 1% increase on environment regulation
gap between trade partners will increase waste trade 0.32%). Impacted by the global
financial crisis, the growth rate subsequently slowed from 2007 to 2009 but recovered
in 2010.
In August 2011, “Measures on the Administration of Import of Solid Waste” was
endorsed. According to this law, any firms without the licenses issued by the Ministry
of Environmental Protection of China (MEP) are prohibited from trading waste. China’s
Customs Department has been empowered to tracking all containers that include waste
products. The law, which established the quota for waste imports, has banned a variety of
wastes eligible for import. For different categories, the values of metal waste and paper
waste declined. However, the value for plastic waste and textile waste showed no signs of
decline, despite accounting for a relatively small fraction of total waste imports. Due to the
rapid development of e-business in China, there has been a fast-growing demand for paper
used packaging of goods. As a likely result, we are unable to identify any contraction in
the quantity of paper waste after 2011.
In 2017, President Xi Jinping proposed that “lucid waters and lush mountains are
invaluable assets”. In the report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China 2017, President Xi said, “Building an ecological civilization is vital to sustain
the Chinese nation’s development. We must realize that lucid waters and lush moun-
tains are invaluable assets and act on this understanding, implement our fundamental
national policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment, and cherish the
environment as we cherish our own lives. We will adopt a holistic approach to conserving
our mountains, rivers, forests, farmlands, lakes, and grasslands, implement the strictest
possible systems for environmental protection, and develop eco-friendly growth models
and ways of life.” This led to significant improvements in the efficiency of implementing
environmental regulations, and within the same year the “Implementation Plan on Ban-
ning Entry of Foreign Garbage and Reforming the Administrative System of Solid Waste
Importation” was promulgated. According to this law, an additional 24 varieties of waste
products imports are banned. Four of them are waste metals, eleven varieties are waste
textiles, eight varieties are waste plastics, and one is waste paper. After 2017, both value
and quantities for all categories of waste imports declined, especially for plastic waste and
textile waste. Compared to 2017, the value of plastic waste dropped by 90.8% in 2018, while
the value of textile waste dropped by 67%. In addition, waste import values declined from
both developed and developing economies, which led to an overall 23.9% decline in 2018
when compared with 2017.
4. Methodology and Data
4.1. Econometric Specification
Earlier research offers various explanations regarding the motivations for the trading
of waste, particularly for countries with restricted environmental regulations that export
wastes to countries without. According to Kellenberg [7], these motivations can be broadly
divided into two hypotheses. The first relates to exporters simply searching for destinations
to dispose of waste products. Due to the differences in the implementation efficiency of
environmental regulations across countries, the flow of waste products is likely to originate
from a developed economy with strict regulations to a developing economy bearing lesser
restrictions. This could be referred to as PHH.
The second hypothesis relates to importers in search of waste products as intermediate
inputs, generating demand for waste-products-searching within the recycling market. Here,
developing economies’ demand is relatively higher for two reasons. One is the relatively
less restrictive regulation within developing countries, which leads to a lower operating
cost for wastes import firms (see, for instance, Yoshida et al. [9], Velis [11], and [10]). The
other is attributed to the developing countries’ faster-growing manufacturing industries
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that led to higher demand for wastes used as an intermediate input (see Higashida and
Managi [24] and Sawhney et al. [17]). This aligns with Higashida and Managi’s [24]
findings that waste imports benefit the developing economies’ manufacturing industries,
while Gregson and Crang [2] broadly promoted that the trading of waste products is an
important part of the global economy. Such motivations could be referred to as RHH.
All forms of motivation can result in future environmental costs to be borne by society.
Thus, according to Antweiler et al. [21] and Henderson and Managi [31], this will lead
destinations’ governments to increase their environmental laws restricting the importation
of waste products. As such, the primary objective of this research is to investigate whether
China’s waste imports are motivated by PHH or RHH. Following Kellenberg [7], Gregson
and Crang [2], and Petridis et al. [19], we specified the model as follows:
lnXcjkt = α + β1PHHcjt + β2RHHct + γC + Ij + Ik + It + εcjkt (1)
where Xcjkt represents China’s waste imports from country j, for waste product k at time
t. Ij is the fixed effect for orientation j, which will absorb the country’s specific effects;
Ik is the fixed effect for industry k, which will absorb the industry-specific effects; It is
the time fixed effect, which will absorb the effects varying across time; and εcjkt is the
error term. PHHcjt represents the array of variables for PHH. Kheder and Zugravn [32],
Ma et al. [33], and Wen and Dai [33] used the difference of GDP per unit amount of
carbon dioxide emission between orientation and destination to denote the difference in
the effectiveness of environmental regulation implementation. Ma et al. [33] and Wen
and Dai [33]) argued that using GDP/CO2 emissions is a better measure of the effects
of environmental regulation compared with directly using the degree of environmental
governance. Directly, the second method cannot comprehensively reflect the factors of
the government’s implementation of a series of laws, which is one of the reasons China’s
waste imports increased rapidly before 2011 despite environmental regulations already
existing. This reveals that a country with restricted environmental regulations exports
waste products to a country with lesser restricted environmental regulations, which can be
treated as a proxy for PHH. On the other hand, Baggs [13], Lepawsky and McNabb [34],
Kusch and Hills [35], Kumar et al. [36], and Balsalobre-Lorente et al. [37] adopted the
difference of GDP per capital between orientation and destination as an alternate proxy. In
this paper, we adopted both proxies for PHH. RHHct denotes the variable for RHH. As
pointed out by Higashida and Managi [24] and Gregson and Crang [2], waste products are
important intermediate inputs in the recycling market. Thus, there is an expected increase
in demand for waste products resulting from increased demand for final goods. The two
variables used to estimate this effect are China’s import value of intermediate material
excluding all waste products and China’s export value of products that use waste-related
raw material, where product selection follows Dussaux [38].
The vector of control variables, denoted by C, follows studies by Kellenberg [7] and
Petridis et al. [19], which include contiguity (dummy variable equals 1 if China and orienta-
tion share a border), common language (dummy variable equals 1 if China and orientation
use same official language), China’s GDP, orientations’ GDP, and free trade agreements
(dummy variable equals 1 if China and orientation have a free trade agreement). Addition-
ally, the use of several patents weighted by population is included to control for technolog-
ical development, while waste products tariffs were added following Dussaux [38].
Given China’s relatively large trade surplus on goods, Kellenberg [6] and Sun [16]
argued that there are substantial profits generated from importing waste products in the
existence of “reverse-haulage” logistics. That is, there exists a large number of empty con-
tainers on the “back-run” routes to China where importers will utilize the extra capacities
of shipping by importing waste products. Thus, we include China’s trade surplus with
the orientation as consideration for these “back-run” effects. We complete the model with
fixed effects and a disturbance term.
Antweiler et al. [21] and Henderson and Millimet [31] revealed that environmental
regulations impact the value of trade. Since 2011, China has improved the implementation
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efficiency of its environmental regulation, and it is believed that the endorsement of the
2017 law leads to huge impacts on China’s plastic and copper waste imports (Hu et al. [18];
Wang et al. [10]). To investigate the impact of China’s environment laws promulgated in
2011 and 2017, the empirical model is then specified as follows:
lnXcjkt = α + β1PHHcjt + β2RHHcjt + β3PHHcjt ∗ Lawct + β2RHHct ∗ Lawct + γC + Ij + Ik + It + εcjkt (2)
where the Lawct represents a dichotomous variable that denotes the endorsement
of China’s environmental laws in 2011 and 2017. PHHcjt ∗ Lawct captures the regulatory
impact under PHH, whereas RHHct ∗ Lawct is used to capture the regulatory impact on
resource hunting. The omission of the Lawct variable (independent) was due to its perfect
collinear relationship with the time fixed effect It.
Because reasons for China’s waste imports from different countries may vary, we
followed earlier research by Baggs [13], Gregson and Crang [2], and Sun [16] to classify
the source countries into developing economies and developed economies for regression
Equations (1) and (2). We also examined the determinants of waste imports by categories
because, in addition to the effects of environmental regulations, different categories of
waste matter in the import industry.
4.2. Data and Descriptions of Variables
This study utilized 28 varieties of waste products with the highest import value at the
HS6 level according to Kellenberg [7]. This accounted for a share of 99.4% of China’s total
waste imports in 2018. Product wastes were separated into four categories—metal, paper,
plastic, and textile—and presented in Table 1. We constructed the panel dataset to include
20 countries and regions (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Philippines, Singapore,
Spain, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the USA) that China imported more than 91%
of its waste from in 2018 and averaged 90% between 1995 and 2018. Table 2 presents the
data source and descriptions of variables.
Table 2. Data source and descriptions of variables.
Variable Name Descriptions Data Source
Explained variable (lnXcjkt)
LnValuecjkt Log of China’s import value for product k from country j at time t. CEPII-BACI Database
LnQuantitycjkt
Log of China’s import quantity for product k from country j at
time t. CEPII-BACI Database
Pollution haven hypothesis variable (PHHct)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
Following Ben and Zugravn (2008); Wen and Dai (2019) and Ma
et al. (2019), a ratio of log GDP/CO2 emission between
orientation and China at time t was used as a proxy for PHH. A
higher value presents the orientation’s effectiveness of
environmental regulation being better than China’s, thus more
likely to export waste products to China for searching relative
cheaper environment costs.
World Bank WDI Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center (CDIAC)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
Following Baggs (2009), Lepawsky and McNabb (2010), Kusch
and Hills (2017), Kumar et al. (2017), and Balsalobre-Lorente et al.
(2019), the ratio of log GDP per Capita between orientation and
China at time t was used as a proxy for PHH. A higher value
presents the orientation’s GDP per Capita to China’s, suggest a
positive relationship to more restricted environment regulations.
World Bank WDI
Sustainability 2021, 13, 932 10 of 21
Table 2. Cont.
Variable Name Descriptions Data Source
Resource hunting hypothesis variable (RHHct)
LnRH_importct
Uses the log of China’s import value of intermediate material
with Broad Economic Categories code as 21, 22, 111, 121,
excluding all waste import, at time t as a proxy for RHH. The




We used the log of China’s export value with HS2 code as 39,
47–49, 50–55, and 72–83 at time t as a proxy for RHH. According
to Dussaux (2015), these sectors use the intermediate input
related to waste imports. Different sectors’ exporting values
associated with different categories of waste were adopted.
CEPII-BACI Database
Control variables’ vector (C)
LnGDP_jt Log of orientation j’s GDP at time t. World Bank WDI
LnGDP_ct Log of China’s GDP at time t. World Bank WDI
Trade_Surcjt
Following Kellenberg (2010) and Sun (2019), we used China’s




Log of patents per million capita in country j at time t as a proxy
of technology level. WIPO IP Database
LnTari f fcjkt
Effective tariff China collected for products k from country j at
time t. WITS Database
Trade_agreecjt
Dummy variable equals 1 if China has a free trade agreement
with country j. WTO Database
Contigcj
Dummy variable equals 1 if China has a common border with
country j. CEPII-Gravity Database
Comlangcj
Dummy variable equals 1 if China has the same official language
as country j. CEPII-Gravity Database
Environmental laws variable (Lawct)
Law2011 Dummy variable equals 1 after 2011 presents the endorsement of“Measures on the Administration of Import of Solid Waste.”
Law2017 Dummy variable equals 1 after 2017 presents the endorsement of“Measures on the Administration of Import of Solid Waste.”
The observed variation levels of the variable data identified in Table 2 are summarized
as statistical measurements and displayed in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary statistics of variables.
Name Obs Mean SD Min Max
LnValuecjkt 13,440 6.62 2.92 0.00 11.81
LnQuantitycjkt 13,440 6.90 3.16 −6.91 12.26
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt 13,440 1.18 0.39 0.35 2.58
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt 13,440 1.59 0.78 −0.61 3.02
LnRH_importct 13,440 19.18 0.94 17.80 20.33
LnRH_exportckt 13,440 18.53 0.94 17.10 19.68
LnGDP_jt 13,440 27.79 1.05 25.87 30.63
LnGDP_ct 13,440 29.72 0.63 28.68 30.67
Trade_Surcjt 13,384 0.09 0.64 −2.08 0.98
LnPATCAPjt 13,440 5.80 1.61 0.84 9.35
LnTari f fcjkt 12,869 −1.00 1.89 −2.30 3.56
Trade_agreecjt 13,440 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Contigcj 13,440 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Comlangcj 13,440 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Law2011 13,440 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Law2017 13,440 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
SD = standard deviation.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 932 11 of 21
5. Results
Table 4 presents the baseline results of Equation (1). The P-value for the Hausman
test is 0.589, which fails to reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients
are non-systematic. Therefore, we adopted the random effects panel analysis, which is
consistent with Petridis et al. [19]. Columns (1) to (4) analyze PHH and RHH for China’s
waste import without Hong Kong (between 1995 and 2018, 96.2% of Hong Kong’s waste
exports to the mainland were re-exports from other locations.). There is a relatively weak
but positive sign for PHH coefficients. However, RHH coefficients are consistent and
positively significant, suggesting that the most important motivation for China’s waste
imports relates to “searching for resources”. There is also some, but weak, motivation
based on the pollution haven premise.
Table 4. Baseline results of Equation (1).
RE RE RE RE LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
0.47 ** 0.47 ** 0.47 ** 0.47 **
(2.10) (2.10) (2.11) (2.11)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
−0.83 −0.83 −0.83 −0.83
(−0.93) (−0.93) (−1.02) (−1.02)
LnRH_importct
7.85 *** 7.39 *** 1.31 *** 0.73
(6.25) (5.70) (14.49) (1.34)
LnRH_exportckt
16.43 *** 16.09 *** 1.38 *** 0.75
(7.56) (7.34) (15.86) (1.31)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE), with robust standard errors corrected. T statistics are in parentheses.
*** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
Following Bun and Klviet [39] and Meschi and Vivarelli [40], columns (5) to (8) report
the estimates with the LSDV method to check the robustness of the results. The results
depict consistency with earlier findings. The results are consistent with Table 4. Columns
of RE refer to the results of the random-effect analysis, whereas the LSDV columns refer to
results of the least square dummy variables analysis.
Hong Kong’s activity was reintroduced into the model (see Table A1), the results
for PHH remains consistent. The coefficient of LnRH_exportckt as a proxy of RHH is
also consistent; however, it is negative due to the distortion caused by Hong Kong’s
wastes re-export. Acting as a hub for waste import, the value of re-export is unable to
comprehensively reflect the factors of Hong Kong’s environmental regulations. Hence,
Hong Kong’s re-export value is excluded from the analysis below. We also used the
logarithmic transformation of China’s waste import quantities as the dependent variable
for robust verification.
Table 5 presents the baseline results of Equation (2), where columns (1) to (4) presents
China’s endorsement of environment law’s impact on PHH and RHH. For PHH, the
influence of the regulations is mixed. Results are not robust based on the choice of dif-
ferent proxy variables, which is likely caused for two reasons. First, the pollution haven
effect is not the major reason for China’s waste imports (significant at a 10% level for
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt, which is consistent with the results in Table 4). Second, the impact of
the regulations varies across countries and categories of waste products.
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Table 5. Baseline results of Equation (2).
RE RE RE RE LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
0.41 * 0.41 * 0.41 * 0.41 *
(1.77) (1.77) (1.78) (1.78)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2011
−0.19 −0.19 −0.19 −0.19
(−1.21) (−1.21) (−1.19) (−1.19)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2017
0.77 *** 0.77 *** 0.77 *** 0.77 ***
(3.04) (3.04) (2.84) (2.84)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
−0.62 −0.62 −0.62 −0.62
(−0.69) (−0.69) (−0.76) (−0.76)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2011
0.55 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 ***
(5.43) (5.43) (5.44) (5.44)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2017
−0.34 ** −0.34 ** −0.34 ** −0.34 **
(−2.00) (−2.00) (−1.98) (−1.98)
LnRH_importct
21.79 *** 21.60 *** 1.40 *** 1.01 **
(8.79) (8.71) (15.85) (2.36)
LnRH_importct ∗ Law2011
−0.02 −0.06 0.00 −0.05 ***
(−0.41) (−1.38) (0.11) (−3.81)
LnRH_importct ∗ Law2017
−0.18 *** −0.12 *** −0.04 ** 0.01
(−7.68) (−5.77) (−2.40) (0.51)
LnRH_exportckt
16.73 *** 16.48 *** 1.30 *** 0.89 **
(7.64) (7.47) (14.53) (2.16)
LnRH_exportckt ∗
Law2011
−0.11 *** −0.15 *** 0.03 ** −0.03
(−7.18) (−9.67) (1.97) (−1.56)
LnRH_exportckt ∗
Law2017
−0.08 *** −0.02 −0.05 *** 0.01
(−4.47) (−1.36) (−2.64) (0.36)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE), with robust standard errors corrected. T statistics are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Under RHH, the coefficients are reflective of those in Table 4, with relatively consistent
regulation impacts. Most coefficients representing interaction terms between the resource
hunting proxy variables and dummy variables on laws are significantly negative, especially
following the endorsement of the 2017 law. We, therefore, posit that China’s environment
laws are focused on restricting importers from searching for waste products as intermediate
inputs. Columns (5) to (8) stand as robustness verification with LSDV estimation. The
results are consistent with columns (1) to (4). Similar to equation (1), when the logarithmic
transformation of China’s waste import quantities is used as the dependent variable, the
results remain consistent. The results of the RE and LSDV estimates in Table 5 match those
expressed in Table 4.
From the results presented, it can be derived that the primary motivation for China’s
waste imports is related to a search for resources, with impact possibilities due to the
re-export agenda. Therefore, China’s environment laws seek to restrict importers from
searching for intermediate inputs, which explains the varied impact of policy across
different sectors.
6. Further Discussions
Table 6 presents the estimation results based on categorized origins of waste imports,
i.e., developed or developing, with columns (1) to (4) presenting the results for developed
countries. Under PHH, the variable LnGDPCAP_gapcjt is positive and significant, while
the alternate proxy produces an insignificant impact. It provides evidence, though weak,
that China’s waste imports are driven by the pollution haven theory, which is consistent
with the results from Tables 4 and 5. This suggests unclear impacts from China’s environ-
mental laws under the pollution haven narrative, which is also consistent with the results
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presented in Table 5. Under RHH, the coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting
that China’s importers are searching for intermediate inputs byway of waste products
imported from developed countries. The endorsement of the 2011 environmental law did
little to discourage resource hunting from developed economies. However, the 2017 law
reduced the motivation to engage in such activities.
Table 6. Results for developed and developing countries.
Developed Countries Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
0.01 0.01 −2.29 *** −2.29 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (−3.16) (−3.16)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2011
−0.21 −0.21 −0.41 −0.41
(−1.10) (−1.10) (−1.21) (−1.21)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2017
1.06 *** 1.06 *** 1.78 1.78
(3.54) (3.54) (1.50) (1.50)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
4.01 *** 4.01 *** −5.82 *** −5.82 ***
(3.34) (3.34) (−2.89) (−2.89)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2011
0.78 *** 0.78 *** −0.15 −0.15
(4.98) (4.98) (−0.57) (−0.57)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2017
−0.95 *** −0.95 *** −0.08 −0.08
(−3.36) (−3.36) (−0.18) (−0.18)
LnRH_importct
15.68 *** 15.08 *** 99.26 *** 105.68 ***
(5.10) (4.90) (11.73) (12.72)
LnRH_importct ∗
Law2011
0.11 ** 0.06 0.81 *** 0.96 ***
(2.18) (1.20) (9.33) (11.69)
LnRH_importct ∗
Law2017
−0.12 *** −0.01 −0.63 *** −0.55 ***
(−4.34) (−0.24) (−7.46) (−11.19)
LnRH_exportckt
7.75 *** 7.46 *** 49.72 *** 52.81 ***
(5.08) (4.89) (11.74) (12.72)
LnRH_exportckt ∗
Law2011
−0.06 −0.10 * −0.24 *** −0.15 ***
(−1.06) (−1.85) (−6.69) (−4.70)
LnRH_exportckt ∗
Law2017
−0.06 ** 0.06 ** −0.23 *** −0.12 ***
(−2.56) (2.24) (−3.39) (−6.06)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8318 8318 8318 8318 3632 3632 3632 3632
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE), with robust standard errors corrected. T statistics are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
For developing economies, the results are listed in columns (5) to (8). The proxy
variables for PHH is indicated as negative, which suggests that motivation under PHH
provides no statistical support regarding China’s waste imports from developing countries.
Thus, 2011 and 2017 environmental laws are ineffective. Under RHH, the findings are
positive and significant. Compared with the results of columns (1) to (4), China’s resource
hunting effect from developing countries is significantly larger than what has originated
from developed countries. Both laws have restricted China’s waste product searching from
developing countries. Additionally, we conducted a robustness check by replacing the
dependent variable with the logarithmic transformation of China’s waste import quantities.
The results remained consistent.
Appendix A Tables A2 and A3 present findings for different categories of waste
from developed economies and developing economies. Appendix A Table A2 shows
the pollution haven effects of plastic waste and textile waste categories. There is no
clear evidence that China’s environmental laws imposed any significant effect under
the PHH of these two categories because of the relatively small import value compared
with total waste imports. For RHH, the coefficients on metal waste are significantly
positive. Chinese importers’ demand-search for waste metals from developed countries
because manufacturing inputs were unabated by the 2011 law. However, the 2017 law
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discourages such import practices. The results are consistent with the results in columns
(1–4) from Table 6.
Appendix A Table A3 presents the results for different categories from developing
countries. Under PHH, all proxy variables for all categories are either negative or insignif-
icant, suggesting that there is no evidence that China’s waste imports from developing
countries resulted from motives under PHH. Consequently, China’s environment regula-
tion has no significant impact on the pollution haven effect for all categories. However,
there is relatively strong evidence that China imports all categories of waste from devel-
oping countries due to “resource hunting” motives, with coefficients significantly larger
when compared with Table 6. The law implemented in 2011 fail to impact resource hunting
motivations for metal waste imports. However, the law of 2017 significantly reduced these
motives for metal waste imports from developing countries. This is similar to the effects on
imports from developed economies for the same categories. For paper waste, plastic waste,
and textile waste categories, both laws reduced China’s importers’ motivation for searching
for waste imports as intermediate inputs. Generally, the results are consistent with columns
(5–8) in Table 6. We also replaced the independent variable with quantity as a robustness
check. The results are presented in Table A4, Table A5, and Table A6. The findings are
mainly consistent with those presented in previous tables. Table A7 presents the results for
different periods crossing 23 years. Both PHH and RHH motivations diminished between
2015 and 2018. It is consistent with the results in Table 5. The endorsement of the 2017 law
deterred motivations of waste import.
Overall, there is no strong evidence that China imports waste in accordance with PHH.
The major reason for the waste imports follows RHH. There are pollution haven effects on
China’s plastic waste and textile waste imports from developed countries. However, due to
the relatively small value for these two categories, the average effect is relatively weak. On
the other hand, Chinese importers are strongly motivated to import waste products to be
used as intermediate manufacturing inputs. China imports metal waste from all countries
and paper waste, plastic waste, and textile waste from developing countries for reasons
categorized under RHH. The environmental law of 2011 focused on the resource hunting
effect on paper waste, plastic waste, and textile waste categories, while the 2017 version of
the law restricts resource hunting activities on all categories of waste.
7. Conclusions and Policy Implication
Previous research has sought to explain the motivations of a country, especially China
as the world’s largest waste import country, for importing waste products by using two
hypotheses—PHH and RHH. Under these two umbrella assumptions, this paper utilizes a
panel dataset of four categories and 28 varieties of traded waste products from 1995 to 2018
to analyze which of the two hypotheses is the major driving force for China’s waste imports.
The findings reveal that, firstly, China’s waste imports are primarily a cause of “resource
hunting” motives. Though “pollution haven” motives exist for the importation of plastic
waste and textile waste from developed countries, such effects are marginal due to the
small trade value in these two categories. Metal waste imports from developed countries
and all categories of waste imports from developing countries are stimulated by the
demand in China for seeking resources as cheap intermediate manufacture inputs [41,42].
Different from Kellenberg’s (2012) view that developing countries import waste due to
lax environmental regulations, this paper finds that the resource-seeking motivation of
China’s waste import supports Higashida and Managi [24]. Secondly, this study found
that the motivation for polluting the paradise and the motivation for resource demand
have heterogeneous effects on China’s waste imports between developed and developing
countries, and between the metal, wood, plastic, and textile industries. China’s scrap
metal imports are for resources, and imports of plastic waste mainly come from developed
countries, which is consistent with Sawhney et al. [17] and Hu et al. [18]. Thirdly, the
environment laws endorsed in 2011 and 2017 have significantly restricted resource hunting
activities, which is consistent with Sun [16]. More specifically, the environmental law of
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2011, which affects paper waste, plastic waste, and textile waste, reduced waste imports
from developing countries significantly, whereas the law from 2017 restricts resource
hunting motives for every sampled category from all orientations.
Although the Chinese government has gradually strengthened the control of waste
imports, a large amount of demand for the import of classified waste products continues.
China’s future environmental policy should have a strategic structure, disposing of different
types of waste separately to ensure that various resources are fully collected and avoid
becoming a pollution paradise, i.e., a place for importation of plastic waste and textile
waste from developed economies.
Meanwhile, relatively large amounts of domestic waste products in China are still
unclassified and yet to be processed. At present, in China’s larger cities, such as Beijing
and Shanghai, waste separation and recycling measures have been adopted. However,
these measures have not yet spread throughout the country. China’s waste sorting and
recycling systems need to be more efficient and replace imports by looking for resources
from the local waste market. The findings of this study have important implications for
China on how to regulate waste imports and for other developing countries’ sustainable
economic development.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Baseline results of Equation (1) within Hong Kong.
RE RE RE RE LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
0.45 ** 0.45 ** 0.45 ** 0.45 **
(2.07) (2.07) (2.10) (2.10)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
−0.43 −0.43 −0.43 −0.43
(−0.49) (−0.49) (−0.54) (−0.54)
LnRH_importct
−28.04 *** −28.15 *** 1.31 *** 1.00 *
(−5.37) (−5.39) (14.83) (1.92)
LnRH_exportckt
29.62 *** 29.74 *** 1.40 *** 1.04 *
(5.37) (5.39) (16.20) (1.89)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,813 12,813 12,813 12,813 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE), with robust standard errors corrected. T statistics are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A2. Results for four categories of waste imports from developed countries.
Metal Waste Paper Waste Plastic Waste Textile Waste
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
0.58 0.58 −0.14 −0.14 −1.30 * −1.30 * −0.31 −0.31
(1.46) (1.46) (−0.19) (−0.19) (−1.73) (−1.73) (−0.51) (−0.51)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2011
−0.33 −0.33 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 −0.30 −0.30
(−1.22) (−1.22) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (−0.74) (−0.74)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2017
1.45 *** 1.45 *** 0.38 0.38 −0.25 −0.25 1.45 ** 1.45 **
(3.44) (3.44) (0.48) (0.48) (−0.32) (−0.32) (2.24) (2.24)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
2.74 2.74 2.17 2.17 7.23 ** 7.23 ** 6.10 ** 6.10 **
(1.62) (1.62) (0.68) (0.68) (2.25) (2.25) (2.34) (2.34)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2011
0.76 *** 0.76 *** 0.54 0.54 0.94 ** 0.94 ** 0.92 *** 0.92 ***
(3.40) (3.40) (1.29) (1.29) (2.27) (2.27) (2.67) (2.67)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2017
−0.89 ** −0.89 ** −0.74 −0.74 −1.29 * −1.29 * −1.01 −1.01
(−2.23) (−2.23) (−0.98) (−0.98) (−1.72) (−1.72) (−1.64) (−1.64)
LnRH_importct
19.88 ** 22.89 *** 16.23 19.89 21.90 39.38 ** 3.25 15.10
(2.56) (2.66) (1.11) (1.22) (1.51) (2.44) (0.27) (1.14)
LnRH_importct ∗
Law2011
0.18 ** 0.21* 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.43 ** 0.01 0.23
(2.43) (1.84) (0.80) (0.87) (0.44) (2.02) (0.06) (1.35)
LnRH_importct ∗
Law2017
−0.17 *** −0.04 −0.10 −0.05 −0.10 −0.08 −0.06 0.04
(−3.21) (−0.80) (−1.04) (−0.46) (−1.02) (−0.83) (−0.80) (0.53)
LnRH_exportckt
10.44 ** 11.94 *** 24.21 29.70 9.71 17.18 ** 1.14 4.84
(2.57) (2.65) (1.10) (1.22) (1.52) (2.43) (0.29) (1.11)
LnRH_exportckt ∗
Law2011
−0.01 −0.01 −0.35 −0.37 −0.28 *** −0.14 −0.03 0.11
(−0.35) (−0.25) (−1.21) (−1.30) (−2.73) (−1.16) (−0.52) (1.13)
LnRH_exportckt ∗
Law2017
−0.09 *** 0.06* −0.02 0.06 −0.03 0.05 −0.05 0.13 ***
(−2.92) (1.70) (−0.41) (0.98) (−0.49) (0.65) (−1.17) (2.62)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 4157 4157 4157 4157 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185 1791 1791 1791 1791
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE). Robust standard errors corrected. T statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A3. Results for four categories of waste imports from developing countries.
Waste Metal Waste Paper Waste Plastic Waste Textile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt −2.50 **
−2.50
** −3.29 * −3.29 *
−3.91
** −3.91 ** −0.14 −0.14
(−2.44) (−2.44) (−1.72) (−1.72) (−1.97) (−1.97) (−0.09) (−0.09)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2011 −0.60 −0.60 0.64 0.64 −1.06 −1.06 −0.18 −0.18
(−1.25) (−1.25) (0.72) (0.72) (−1.16) (−1.16) (−0.25) (−0.25)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt ∗
Law2017 0.84 0.84 2.55 2.55 0.47 0.47 4.18 4.18
(0.50) (0.50) (0.82) (0.82) (0.15) (0.15) (1.63) (1.63)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt −6.37 ** −6.37 ** −2.81 −2.81 −8.13 −8.13 −4.96 −4.96
(−2.25) (−2.25) (−0.52) (−0.52) (−1.48) (−1.48) (−1.14) (−1.14)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2011 −0.10 −0.10 −0.76 −0.76 0.61 0.61 −0.43 −0.43
(−0.26) (−0.26) (−1.07) (−1.07) (0.83) (0.83) (−0.74) (−0.74)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt ∗
Law2017 −0.12 −0.12 −0.85 −0.85 0.46 0.46 0.17 0.17
(−0.19) (−0.19) (−0.70) (−0.70) (0.37) (0.37) (0.17) (0.17)




*** 67.87 *** 75.27 *** 74.05 ***
(6.66) (7.47) (4.49) (4.25) (5.57) (5.53) (7.76) (7.62)
LnRH_importct ∗
Law2011 0.63 *** 0.81 *** −0.44 **
−0.39
** 0.06 −0.01 −0.22 −0.20
(5.17) (6.93) (−2.22) (−2.09) (0.31) (−0.07) (−1.33) (−1.31)
LnRH_importct ∗




** −0.45 *** −0.78 *** −0.54 ***
(−3.90) (−6.35) (−3.13) (−4.95) (−2.35) (−4.63) (−4.80) (−7.14)
LnRH_exportckt
41.74









*** −0.04 −2.29 *** −2.17 *** −0.62 *** −0.39 * −0.07 −0.03
(−2.74) (−0.90) (−5.33) (−5.12) (−2.73) (−1.83) (−0.84) (−0.38)
LnRH_exportckt ∗
Law2017 −0.15 −0.08 *** −0.25 −0.06 −0.23 −0.06
−0.33
** −0.07 *
(−1.47) (−2.90) (−1.27) (−1.40) (−1.11) (−0.67) (−2.07) (−1.79)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1817 1817 1817 1817 519 519 519 519 519 519 519 519 777 777 777 777
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE), with robust standard errors corrected. T statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A4. Baseline results of Equation (1) with quantity as the dependent variable.
LnQuantitycjkt
RE LSDV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
−0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
(−0.22) (−0.22) (−0.23) (−0.23)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
−0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(−0.01) (−0.01) (−0.01) (−0.01)
LnRH_importct
7.29 *** 7.30 *** 0.83 *** 0.82
(5.19) (5.04) (8.73) (1.35)
LnRH_exportckt
11.39 *** 11.40 *** 1.06 *** 1.06 *
(4.69) (4.66) (11.08) (1.65)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE). T statistics are in parentheses. *** and * denote significance at 1% and
10%, respectively.
Table A5. Baseline results of Equation (2) with quantity as the dependent variable.
LnQuantitycjkt
RE LSDV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.55) (0.55) (0.58) (0.58)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt∗Law2011
−0.76 *** −0.76 *** −0.76 *** −0.76 ***
(−4.42) (−4.42) (−4.26) (−4.26)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt∗Law2017
0.76 *** 0.76 *** 0.76 ** 0.76 **
(2.65) (2.65) (2.45) (2.45)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt∗Law2011
0.19 * 0.19 * 0.19 * 0.19 *
(1.71) (1.71) (1.81) (1.81)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt∗Law2017
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27)
LnRH_importct
19.75 *** 19.63 *** 0.90 *** 0.89 *
(7.14) (7.09) (9.93) (1.86)
LnRH_importct∗Law2011
0.12 *** 0.06 0.03 * −0.03 **
(2.61) (1.43) (1.85) (−2.03)
LnRH_importct∗Law2017
−0.13 *** −0.10 *** −0.03 * 0.01
(−5.22) (−4.21) (−1.75) (0.42)
LnRH_exportckt
11.49 *** 11.69*** 0.86 *** 0.83 *
(4.70) (4.74) (9.38) (1.79)
LnRH_exportckt∗Law2011
−0.05 *** −0.10*** 0.07 *** 0.01
(−3.04) (−5.79) (4.44) (0.70)
LnRH_exportckt∗Law2017
−0.05 *** −0.01 −0.04 * 0.00
(−2.71) (−0.89) (−1.90) (0.27)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE). T statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
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Table A6. Results for developed and developing countries with quantity as the dependent variable.
LnQuantitycjkt
Developed Countries Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt
−0.04 −0.04 −1.94 *** −1.94 ***
(−0.13) (−0.13) (−2.74) (−2.74)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt∗Law2011
−0.91 *** −0.91 *** 0.59 * 0.59 *
(−4.17) (−4.17) (1.79) (1.79)
LnGDPCO2_gapcjt∗Law2017
1.13 *** 1.13 *** −2.61 ** −2.61 **
(3.31) (3.31) (−2.25) (−2.25)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
5.20 *** 5.20 *** −8.85 *** −8.85 ***
(3.79) (3.79) (−4.51) (−4.51)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt∗Law2011
0.46 ** 0.46 ** 0.65 ** 0.65 **
(2.57) (2.57) (2.50) (2.50)
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt∗Law2017
−0.02 −0.02 0.67 0.67
(−0.07) (−0.07) (1.47) (1.47)
LnRH_importct
12.70 *** 12.79 *** 71.72 *** 81.52 ***
(3.61) (3.63) (8.65) (10.05)
LnRH_importct∗Law2011
0.17 *** 0.10 * 0.55 *** 0.77 ***
(2.92) (1.68) (6.45) (9.53)
LnRH_importct∗Law2017
−0.11 *** −0.05 −0.23 *** −0.39 ***
(−3.28) (−1.35) (−2.76) (−8.23)
LnRH_exportckt
6.24 *** 6.31 *** 35.82 *** 40.71 ***
(3.58) (3.61) (8.64) (10.04)
LnRH_exportckt∗Law2011
0.03 −0.04 −0.21 *** −0.10 ***
(0.51) (−0.65) (−5.96) (−2.96)
LnRH_exportckt∗Law2017
−0.06 ** 0.01 0.07 −0.06 ***
(−2.04) (0.25) (0.98) (−3.20)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 8318 8318 8318 8318 3632 3632 3632 3632
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
All models include the country (FE), industry (FE), and time (FE). T statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
Table A7. Time−phased results.
1995–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 2015–2018
RE RE RE RE RE
LnGDPCAP_gapcjt
−0.40 *** 0.32 ** 0.45 *** 0.56 *** −19.35 ***
(−3.94) (2.45) (3.07) (4.30) (−3.48)
LnRH_importct
4.45 *** 7.18 *** 2.11 *** 8.16 *** −18.38
(6.64) (4.94) (3.06) (3.26) (−0.95)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2986 2616 2627 2508 1432
R2 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06
T statistics are in parentheses. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
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